

# Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine



WP n°6/2014

Document de travail

Not in my Community: Social Pressure and the Geography of Dismissals\*

Andrea Bassanini  
Giorgio Brunello  
Eve Caroli

# Not in my Community: Social Pressure and the Geography of Dismissals<sup>\*</sup>

Andrea Bassanini<sup>♦</sup>

Giorgio Brunello<sup>\*</sup>

Eve Caroli<sup>♠</sup>

July 2014

## Abstract

There is growing evidence that social pressure shapes firms' behavior. Given how sensitive communities are to downsizing, this suggests that firms are likely to be under strong social pressure when considering reducing employment. Using French linked employer-employee data, we show that social pressure induces firms to refrain from dismissing at short distance from their headquarters. More specifically, we find that, within firms, secondary establishments located further away from headquarters have higher dismissal rates than those located closer, taking into account the possible endogeneity of plant location. We also find that the positive effect of distance on dismissals increases with the visibility of the firm in the local community of its headquarters. This effect is also stronger the greater the degree of selfishness of the community in which the headquarters are located. This suggests that local social pressure at headquarters is a key determinant of the positive relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals. We show that our results cannot be entirely accounted for by alternative explanations of the distance-dismissal relationship that are put forward in the literature.

JEL codes: M12, M51, J23, J63, R12

---

<sup>\*</sup> The views expressed here are those of the authors and cannot be attributed to the OECD or its member countries. We are grateful to Philippe Askenazy, Vincent Bignon, Christiane Caroli, Salvo Di Falco, Gilles Duranton, Alex Hijzen, Miren Lafourcade, Carlo Menon, Michele Pellizzari, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, François Ryckx, Sébastien Roux, Maurizio Zanardi and participants to seminars at the University of Geneva, GATE-Lyon II and Lancaster University Management School and at the Conference on Firm-level Analysis of Labour Issues, Louvain-la-Neuve, May 2014, and the 5<sup>th</sup> IZA Conference on Entrepreneurship, Potsdam, July 2014, who provided useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Matteo Bassanini for excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours.

<sup>♦</sup> OECD and IZA.

<sup>\*</sup> University of Padova, Lancaster University Management School, CESifo and IZA.

<sup>♠</sup> Paris-Dauphine University, LEDa-LEGOS, Paris School of Economics and IZA.

## Introduction

There is growing evidence in the literature that firms are sensitive to social pressure and that this affects their decisions. Good examples of this can be found in the area of corporate social responsibility – see e.g. Schmitz and Schrader (2013). It has been shown that firms accommodate social pressure in order to maximize their market value since socially-responsible actions increase customers' propensity to buy their goods and services – see Baron (2011), Luo and Bhattacharya (2006). Moreover, some scholars argue that, if firm's stakeholders are philanthropic, they may ask firms to do good on their behalf. More specifically, if stakeholders want firms to behave as good corporate citizens, "delegated philanthropy" may induce firms to refrain from polluting, engage in fair-trade activities, etc. In this case, social pressure affects firms' decisions even if it has no direct impact on their profits – see Benabou and Tirole (2010).

Social pressure also arises at the local level when communities try to protect themselves from projects that would generate a disproportionate cost for them. One example is the resistance of local communities against the implantation of polluting infrastructure in their district – the so-called NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) syndrome (e.g. Frey et al., 1996). Beyond polluting projects, any action that may generate damages to the local community is likely to give rise to social pressure opposing it. Massive dismissals have long been considered as a major threat to local communities, as shown by their prominence in popular media – see, for example, Michael Moore's film *Roger and Me* (1989) focusing almost entirely on the consequences of the massive downsizing carried out by General Motors in Flint, Michigan. More generally, avoiding the social cost of dismissals is typically acknowledged as one of the key reasons justifying firing regulations (e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2008).

This suggests that local communities are likely to put firms under strong pressure in order to limit the number of dismissals in their area as much as possible. There is evidence in the literature that CEOs and top executives are particularly sensitive to the social pressure arising from individuals with whom they have the most frequent interactions (e.g. Cronqvist et al., 2009). This suggests that CEOs should be more sensitive to the social pressure in the community where they work every day – and maybe live – than to that arising in communities located further away. In fact, D'Aurizio and Romano (2013) provide evidence that, during the Great Recession, Italian family firms have faced increasing social pressure to act as social buffers: confronted with a large negative aggregate shock, they have expanded employment more – or contracted less – in the region of their headquarters than in other regions. To the

extent that decisions regarding the level of employment and dismissals are taken centrally by CEOs and/or top executives, one would expect multi-plant firms to reduce as much as possible the number of dismissals in plants located at short distance from headquarters.

In this paper, we provide evidence that dismissal rates increase with the distance of the plant to the firm's headquarters and that local social pressure at headquarters is a key factor explaining this relation. Although our contribution is essentially empirical, we present a simple theoretical model with employment adjustment costs in which social pressure is perceived by the CEO as an additional dismissal cost. Since CEOs are more sensitive to social pressure arising from their own community, perceived adjustment costs are higher for plants located closer to the headquarters. As standard in models with adjustment costs, dismissals are decreasing with adjustment costs and hence increasing with the distance of the plant to the headquarters.

Our empirical analysis is based on French data. Looking at France to study the geographical dispersion of dismissals is interesting because the threshold number of dismissals beyond which (more expensive) collective dismissal procedures apply is defined at the *firm* level. By contrast, in many other countries (e.g. the United States, Switzerland, etc...) this threshold is set at the establishment level, which provides an incentive to spread dismissals across plants in order to escape costly regulations. We match two large plant-level administrative datasets, which also contain information on workers: i) the *Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales* (DADS), which contains complete social security records, including the geographical location of the plant and firm's headquarters, and covers all plants and firms in the non-agricultural business sector; and ii) the *Déclarations des Mouvements de Main d'Oeuvre* (DMMO-EMMO), which contains quarterly worker flows for all plants with more than 50 workers and a 25% random sample of those between 10 and 50 workers. By matching these datasets, we obtain information on the geographical dispersion of workers' flows for over 5,000 multi-establishment firms and over 29,000 plants. Our data cover the period 2002-2007, which roughly corresponds to a complete business cycle for France.

Using these data, we investigate the relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals, and the potential role of social pressure in shaping it. We first show that, within the same firm, secondary establishments located further away from the headquarters have higher dismissal rates than establishments located closer to them. When conducting our analysis, we take into account the potential endogeneity of the distance to headquarters. More specifically, we instrument actual distance with potential distance, defined as the distance at

which the establishment would have been from the headquarters if its location had been chosen only to maximize the market potential of the firm (measuring the capacity of the firm to serve large final markets while minimizing transport costs). We discuss in detail why the orthogonality conditions are likely to hold. As a second step, we provide evidence that the distance-dismissal relationship is, at least partly, due to social pressure in the local community where firms' headquarters are located. We first show that the positive effect of distance on dismissals increases with the firm's visibility at headquarters. More precisely, the larger the weight of the firm in the total employment of its headquarters' local labor market, the stronger the positive effect of distance on dismissals. We then show that the effect of distance is greater the more selfish the local community where the headquarters are located. We measure selfishness as the inverse of local generosity and measure the latter as the share of charitable giving in local GDP as of 1887. We interpret these results as providing evidence that managerial decisions regarding dismissals are affected by social pressure exerted by the local community of the headquarters. In particular, our finding on visibility is consistent with the idea that the incentive that a firm has to engage in a behavior demanded by stakeholders increases with the firm's visibility with respect to these stakeholders (Benabou and Tirole, 2010). In addition, our result on generosity is consistent with the idea that when "public spirit" is lower, communities care essentially about themselves and are more prone to shift the burden of painful adjustments onto others (Frey et al., 1996).

We are aware of only four other papers pointing to a relationship between distance to headquarters and employment downsizing in secondary plants (Landier et al., 2009, Giroud, 2013, Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013, Yonker, 2013), all looking at US data. These papers suggest that the positive relation between distance and dismissals could be due to information asymmetries, monitoring costs, within-firm social pressure and/or place attachment (the sense of identity of the CEO with her home region, inducing her to be kinder to those coming from that community). Other possible common-sense explanations have to do either with sorting of workers and managers or altruistic attitudes of socially-concerned top executives. Even though we cannot exclude that these explanations play a role in explaining the relationship between distance and dismissals, we show that they cannot simultaneously account for the significant interactions between distance and visibility on the one hand and distance and generosity on the other. We conclude that local social pressure is the only possible explanation that can account for all our empirical findings, thereby showing that it is a key factor shaping the geography of dismissals.

Our paper also relates to the literature on weak corporate governance and entrenchment. As shown by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010), entrenched managers look for a "quiet life" and therefore tend to buy peace with their workers by paying higher than profit-maximizing wages. Cronqvist et al. (2009) show that this effect is stronger for workers who are closer to the CEO, either within the organizational hierarchy or because they work in the same municipality. This suggests that CEOs are sensitive to the social pressure arising from within the firm. Our paper shows that they are also sensitive to local social pressure arising from outside the firm.

Our paper also speaks to the literature on image-motivated altruism and social pressure. Research in this area shows that individuals want to be liked and respected by others and that they seek to gain social approval of their behavior (see e.g. Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Of course, the value of image depends on visibility. As regards charity giving, it has been shown that individuals are much more generous when donations are made public than when they remain private information, and that their degree of generosity increases with their visibility (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004, Ariely et al., 2009, Soetevent, 2011, Della Vigna et al., 2012, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2014). This suggests that altruism is, at least partly, image-motivated and that individuals are sensitive to the social pressure arising from their immediate social environment. When visibility is very high, this may even lead them to make decisions that breach professional ethics. Garicano et al (2005) indeed show that soccer referees internalize the preferences of the crowd attending the matches in their decisions, by systematically favoring the home team. In this paper, we show that social pressure arising from the community also impacts human resource managerial practices when the firm is highly visible in its community.

## **1. A Simple Model of Social Pressure and Dismissals**

In order to clarify the mechanisms at work, in this section we sketch a highly-stylized model of employment decisions under social pressure. We assume a continuum of identical firms between 0 and 1. Each firm is composed of two production plants and headquarters. Near each plant and the headquarters lives a community. No production occurs at headquarters. We index by 1 the plant which is the closest to the headquarters and by 2 the plant which is further away.<sup>1</sup> Employment decisions are taken by the CEO,<sup>2</sup> who is assumed to live in the

---

<sup>1</sup> We do not model here why a firm has more than one plant, and why plants are located at different distances from headquarters.

municipality where the headquarters are located. The CEO maximizes the present discounted value of her utility, which is affected by profits and local social pressure in the community where she lives.<sup>3</sup> The instantaneous utility  $U$  of the CEO of firm  $F$  at time  $t$  is given by:

$$U_{Ft} = \pi_{Ft} - SP_{Ft}$$

where  $\pi$  stands for profits and  $SP$  for social pressure at headquarters. We assume that local communities care about dismissals so that they put pressure on CEOs in order to avoid them. Only the pressure exerted by the community where the firm's headquarters are located significantly affects the CEO's utility. Modelling social pressure as a linear function of dismissals, the CEO's utility may be rewritten as:

$$U_{Ft} = \pi_{Ft} - b_1 D_{1Ft} - b_2 D_{2Ft} \quad (1.1)$$

where  $D$  denotes dismissals. We assume that the local community particularly dislikes dismissals when they take place at short distance since this increases the risk that local people be affected. In addition, the more selfish the local community is, the less it cares about dismissals affecting other communities. This implies that  $b_1 > b_2$  and that the gap between  $b_1$  and  $b_2$  will be larger, the greater the degree of selfishness of the local community where the firm's headquarters are located.

Both plants produce final output. For simplicity, their production functions are assumed to be identical and independent from one another.<sup>4</sup> They can be written as  $f(\theta_{it}, N_{it})$ , where  $i = 1, 2$  indexes plants,  $N$  denotes employment<sup>5</sup> and  $\theta$  is a productivity shock – with  $f$  increasing in  $\theta$  – taking the form of a Poisson process with two states: good ( $G$ ) and bad ( $B$ ), so that  $\theta_G > \theta_B$ . Shocks are identically distributed across plants and firms. They are also independent across firms, although they may be correlated across plants of the same firm. Let the instantaneous probability of transition between  $G$  and  $B$  be denoted by  $\lambda_G$ , and the probability of transition between  $B$  and  $G$  be denoted by  $\lambda_B$ . We also assume that  $f$  is continuous and

---

<sup>2</sup> Our assumption is that employment decisions are taken centrally at headquarters. For the sake of simplicity, we represent these decisions as taken by the CEO even if, in practice, they may also be taken by other top executives.

<sup>3</sup> In this framework, social pressure is assumed to have a direct impact on CEO's utility. Our results would be unchanged if, alternatively, we assumed that the CEO only cares about profits and social pressure were modelled as raising employment adjustment costs, thereby reducing firms' profits.

<sup>4</sup> Giroud and Mueller (2014) show that idiosyncratic shocks affecting one plant have, on average, no impact on the level of employment of other plants in the same firm. This suggests that our assumption of separability is not inconsistent with empirical evidence. In the case of firm-level shocks, it can be easily shown that our results also hold in the absence of separability – proof available from authors upon request.

<sup>5</sup> Index  $F$  is omitted hereafter to simplify notations.

three times differentiable, with  $f_N > 0$ ,  $f_{NN} < 0$  and  $f_{NNN} \geq 0$ , where  $f_N$ ,  $f_{NN}$  and  $f_{NNN}$  denote the first, second and third derivatives with respect to  $N$ , respectively.

Plants are wage-takers and firms are price-takers, with the price of output normalized to 1. Therefore, wages and prices do not vary according to whether plants are in a good or bad state. Employment increases with hirings and decreases with dismissals. Dismissals occur in the presence of negative shocks – productivity shifts from the good to the bad state – and hirings take place with positive shocks – or shifts from the bad to the good state. We rule out voluntary quits and churning for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, dismissals are equal to the absolute value of employment changes when the latter are negative, and zero otherwise, and hirings are equal to the absolute value of employment changes when positive, and zero otherwise. Both hirings and dismissals are costly. Adjustment costs are assumed to be linear in employment changes and identical across plants. In particular, hiring costs are given by  $HC_i = c_h H_i$  – with  $H$  standing for hirings – and dismissal costs are given by  $DC_i = c_d D_i$ .

Following Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), we restrict our attention to stationary employment levels. On the basis of these assumptions, we can rewrite equation (1.1) as follows:

$$U_t = \sum_{i=1}^2 f(\theta_{it}, N_{it}) - \sum_{i=1}^2 w_t N_{it} - \sum_{i=1}^2 c_h H_{it} - \sum_{i=1}^2 (c_d + b_i) D_{it}$$

By construction, this utility function is separable across plants. Therefore, the CEO's intertemporal maximization problem comes down to maximizing separately the contribution of each plant to the present discounted value of her utility. This corresponds, for each plant, to a standard model of adjustment costs whose solution is well-known (see for example Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004): optimal employment fluctuates between two values depending on whether the plant is in a good or bad state:

$$f_N(\theta_G, N_i^G) = w + \lambda_G(c_d + b_i) + (r + \lambda_G)c_h \quad \text{if } \theta_{it} = \theta_G \quad (1.2)$$

$$f_N(\theta_B, N_i^B) = w - \lambda_B c_h - (r + \lambda_B)(c_d + b_i) \quad \text{if } \theta_{it} = \theta_B \quad (1.3)$$

where  $r$  is the discount rate of the CEO and the values  $N^G$  and  $N^B$  correspond to the levels of labor demand in good and bad states, respectively, assuming that the difference between  $\theta_G$  and  $\theta_B$  is sufficiently large so that  $N^G > N^B$ .<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> If this assumption does not hold, employment never changes so that hirings and dismissals are always equal to 0.

Defining optimal dismissals as  $D_i^*(b_i) = N_i^G - N_i^B$ , exploiting the properties of the derivative of inverse functions and taking into account that  $f_{NN} < 0$ , we have:

$$\frac{\partial D_i^*}{\partial b_i} = \frac{\partial N_i^G}{\partial b_i} - \frac{\partial N_i^B}{\partial b_i} = \frac{\lambda_G}{f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_i^G)} + \frac{r + \lambda_B}{f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_i^B)} < 0 \quad (1.4)$$

Therefore,  $b_1 > b_2$  implies that the plant that is further away from the headquarters dismisses more workers when hit by a negative shock than does the plant that is closer (see Figure 1), that is  $D_1^*(b_1) < D_2^*(b_2)$ .

Assuming that the economy is in a stationary equilibrium with a proportion  $\rho$  of plants in good state, having a continuum of identical firms that are subject to i.i.d. shocks implies that at each point in time there are  $\rho\lambda_G$  plants of both types (1 and 2) whose state shifts from good to bad thereby giving rise to dismissals. Aggregating across firms and using the law of large numbers, we obtain for each type of plant:

$$E(D_{iFt}) = \int D_{iFt} dF = \rho\lambda_G D_i^*(b_i).$$

where  $E$  is the expectation operator. In other words, at any point in time, aggregate dismissals in plants of type  $i$  are proportional to  $D_i^*$  and therefore lower in plants located closer to headquarters than in plants located further away.

This model may be easily generalized to an arbitrary number of plants generating an inverse relation between distance to headquarters and dismissals, by assuming that  $b_i$  decreases with the distance of plant  $i$  to the firm's headquarters. This assumption captures the fact that the local community of the headquarters is likely to care more about communities located closer – and with which it has frequent interactions – than about communities located further away.

Benabou and Tirole (2010) argue that the incentive for a firm to engage in a behavior demanded by stakeholders increases with its visibility with respect to them. We therefore expect social pressure to be greater or more effective, the greater the visibility of the firm in the community of its headquarters. This implies that  $b_i$  can be re-written as:

$$b_i = \alpha\gamma_i$$

with  $\alpha$  increasing in firm visibility at the headquarters and  $\gamma_i$  representing the effect of social pressure for a given level of visibility. At this point, our above-mentioned assumption that local communities particularly dislike dismissals when they take place at short distance, translates into  $\gamma_1 > \gamma_2$ , with the gap between  $\gamma_1$  and  $\gamma_2$  being larger, the greater the degree of

selfishness of the local community where the headquarters are located. Let us therefore write  $\gamma_2 = \gamma_1/\beta$  where  $\beta \geq 1$  is a measure of the degree of selfishness of the local community of the headquarters while  $\gamma_1$  measures social pressure at, or close to, headquarters.

What is then the impact of firm visibility on the relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals? As shown in Appendix A1,  $\partial(D_2^* - D_1^*)/\partial\alpha > 0$  if the degree of selfishness is large enough. In other words, in the presence of social pressure at headquarters, if the community of the headquarters is sufficiently selfish, the more visible the firm is, the stronger the positive impact of distance on dismissals. It also follows from equation (1.4) that  $\partial(D_2^* - D_1^*)/\partial\beta > 0$  – that is an increase in the degree of selfishness increases the effect of distance on dismissals. Finally, as shown in Appendix A2, if the degree of selfishness is large enough,  $\partial^2(D_2^* - D_1^*)/\partial\alpha\partial\beta > 0$  for any given level of social pressure at headquarters. In other words, if the community where the headquarters are located is sufficiently selfish, the effect of visibility on the steepness of the relationship between distance and dismissals increases with the degree of selfishness.

To sum up, this model shows that local social pressure may generate a positive relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals. It also provides three additional testable predictions. For a sufficiently high degree of selfishness, the effect of distance on dismissals i) increases with the firm's visibility in the community of its headquarters; ii) increases with the degree of selfishness of this community; and iii) is magnified wherever high visibility combines with a strong degree of selfishness. In the remainder of the paper, we test these predictions and use them to disentangle the role of local social pressure in explaining the geography of dismissals from that of other explanations provided in the literature.

## 2. The Data

The data we use come from different sources since we need to combine information on dismissals, distance of secondary establishments to headquarters, local generosity and a number of establishments' as well as local areas' characteristics.

The first data source we use contains social security records – the DADS, Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales. They cover the universe of establishments and firms in all sectors except agriculture, part of the food-processing industry and rural financial institutions (e.g. Crédit Agricole). The DADS are available since 1997 for, on average, 1,350,739 firms

and 1,594,361 establishments with non-zero employment per year.<sup>7</sup> They contain information on the municipality where each establishment is located. However, this information is reliable only since 2002 because, before that date, municipality codes were poorly reported in the records and often missing. Moreover, in 2008, a new form of separation was introduced in France for workers on permanent contracts: the so-called "*rupture conventionnelle*" (conventional separation). This reduced the possibility of filing complaints in courts in case of mutually voluntary separations, while simultaneously granting access to unemployment benefits for separating workers. However, there is evidence that in a number of cases *ruptures conventionnelles* substituted for dismissals while in others – for older workers for example – they replaced quits – see Minni (2013). As a consequence, the number of dismissals – and quits – is hardly comparable before and after 2008. To avoid these problems, we restrict our sample to the 6 years spanning from 2002 to 2007. The location provided by the DADS is unique for each establishment with a given identifier because identifiers change when establishments move. As a consequence, the location of any establishment – identified by a given identifier – is time-invariant. The DADS also contain establishment-level information on the number of employees excluding apprentices and trainees, the gender and occupational structure of the workforce, as well as the establishment's age and industry. Since this information refers to December 31<sup>st</sup> of each year and that we wish to avoid having controls that are post-dated with respect to dismissals, most of our analyses are carried out for the period 2003-2007.

For each firm in our sample, the DADS provide information on the identifier of its headquarters and its municipality. A small proportion of headquarters in our sample (8.7%) changes municipality over time. However, some of these changes are clearly implausible. For example, some headquarters change municipality several times between 2002 and 2007, going back and forth between two locations. To overcome this problem, we select as unique headquarters over the sample period the establishment that is most frequently reported to be so.<sup>8</sup> Finally the DADS also have information both on the legal category of the firm (commercial company, public administration, charity etc.) and on firm age.

The second source that we use is the DMMO/EMMO database. The DMMO (Déclarations sur les Mouvements de Main-d'Oeuvre) has exhaustive quarterly data on gross worker flows (hirings and separations, excluding temporary help workers) for establishments with 50

---

<sup>7</sup> These figures show that a wide majority of French firms are mono-establishment and hence outside the scope of our analysis.

<sup>8</sup> Our results are robust to excluding all firms whose headquarters change municipality over time.

employees or more. The data on separations are broken down by type of flow (dismissals, quits, end-of-trial period, end of fixed-term contracts and retirement). The EMMO (Enquête sur les Mouvements de Main-d'Oeuvre) has identical information on a representative sample of establishments with less than 50 employees. We build hiring and separation rates for each quarter over 2002-2007. The hiring rate is defined as the ratio of all hires during a given quarter to the average employment level in that quarter<sup>9</sup> and the separation rate as the sum of all types of separations divided by average employment.

Information on the latitude and longitude of municipalities is provided by the *Répertoire Géographique des Communes*.<sup>10</sup> Great-circle distances between establishments are computed assuming that each establishment is placed at the barycenter of the municipality to which it belongs. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption but given that there are more than 36,000 municipalities in France and that 99% of them have a surface smaller than 70.8 km<sup>2</sup>,<sup>11</sup> the error we are making on the actual location is very small.<sup>12</sup> However, a consequence of this assumption is that two establishments located in the same municipality will be at zero distance from each other by definition. As regards administrative boundaries, we know the 94 mainland French *départements* and the 21 mainland regions to which each municipality belongs. Furthermore, the *Base Communale des Zones d'Emploi*<sup>13</sup> provides information on the "employment area" where each municipality is located. These areas are defined on the basis of daily commuting patterns as observed at the beginning of the 1990s. Employment areas are meant to capture local labor markets and most of them correspond to a city and its catchment area. There are 341 such areas in mainland France with an average size of 1,420 km<sup>2</sup>, which represents a relatively fine partition of the French territory.

We match these data sources (DADS, DMMO-EMMO and geographical databases), and keep commercial companies registered in France in the non-agricultural, non-mining business sector.<sup>14</sup> We drop establishments for which dismissal rates or some of our establishment-level controls are missing. We only consider multi-establishment firms. Since we want to compare dismissal rates across secondary establishments within firms, we only retain companies with

---

<sup>9</sup> The average employment level in a quarter is defined as half of the sum of the employment levels at the beginning and the end of the quarter (see e.g. Davis et al. 2006).

<sup>10</sup> This database is produced by the French *Institut National de l'Information Géographique et Forestière* (IGN).

<sup>11</sup> Only 2 municipalities in France have a surface larger than 250 km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> This means that most municipalities are no larger than a rectangle of 7x10 km, which means that, assuming that establishments are located at the barycenter, the maximum possible error for 99% of French municipalities is about 6 km.

<sup>13</sup> This database is provided by the French Statistical Institute (INSEE).

<sup>14</sup> This corresponds to sectors 15 to 74 in the NACE-Rev1 classification.

at least two secondary establishments in our dataset. Our final sample contains 29,508 secondary establishments belonging to 5,019 different firms.

Descriptive statistics of this sample are presented in Appendix Table A1. Quarterly dismissal rates are on average slightly less than 1% (0.97%) and mean distance to headquarters is about 248 km. Blue-collars account for one third of establishment-level employment, while clerks and technicians/supervisors are respectively 27% and 25%, and managers 15%. Women represent 37% of the workforce and 67% of the establishments belong to the service sector while 21% are in the manufacturing industry. Average firm and establishment size are 907 and 136 respectively. Most establishments are at least 5 years old (63%)<sup>15</sup> and average firm age is 29 years.

The visibility of a firm in the employment area of its headquarters is assumed to be an increasing function of its share of local employment. We measure this share as of December 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, in order for it to be pre-dated with respect to our sample. However, as we do not know whether the relationship between firm's visibility and its share of local employment is linear, we convert the latter variable into binomial indicators of high and low visibility. As evidenced in Appendix Table A2, the distribution of the firm's share of local employment is quite skewed. So, in our empirical analysis, we capture visibility with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the upper 25% of the distribution and 0 otherwise.<sup>16</sup> We call high-visibility firms those firms for which this dummy variable is equal to 1 and low-visibility firms those for which it is equal to zero.

Information on generosity in the area where the firm's headquarters are located is obtained from the 1890 *Annuaire Statistique de la France*, which provides information on local total charitable giving at the *département* level as measured in 1887. We standardize these donations by *département*-level GDP.<sup>17</sup> The advantage of measuring generosity using data from more than a century ago is that this measure can be treated as exogenous with respect to dismissals in 2003-2007.<sup>18</sup> Descriptive statistics for this variable are provided in Appendix

---

<sup>15</sup> Establishment age is often missing in the DADS. To preserve sample size, we construct an age variable using the presence of the establishment in previous waves of the DADS. Since these are available only from 1997 onward, our age variable is truncated at 5 years and most establishments are in the oldest age category. However, in our regressions, the coefficient of the dummy variable "5 years or more" is never significantly different from that of the dummy variable "4 years old". This is consistent with the results of Haltiwanger et al. (2013) who show that most job flows occur in the earliest years of establishments' life.

<sup>16</sup> A similar measure of firm visibility is used by D'Aurizio and Romano (2013).

<sup>17</sup> *Département*-level GDP is provided by Fontvieille (1982). It is measured as of 1864, which is the year closest to 1887 for which such information is available.

<sup>18</sup> At the same time, this measure of generosity is correlated with current generosity as measured by the 2003-2010 average ratio of charity donations to taxable income (computed at the level of *départements*). The

Table A2. As for visibility, the distribution is skewed; therefore, we consider that headquarters are located in high-generosity *départements* when the latter belong to the upper 25% of the donation-to-GDP distribution. Symmetrically, headquarters are considered to be located in low-generosity *départements* when the latter belong to the bottom 75% of the distribution. Note that this threshold also corresponds to the median of our sample in terms of quarter-by-establishment observations.

### 3. The Econometric Model

#### 3.1 Dismissals and distance to headquarters

As a first step, we estimate the following relation between dismissal rates in secondary establishments and their distance to the firm's headquarters:

$$DR_{iFt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Dist_i + X_{iFt}\beta_2 + D_t + D_F + \varepsilon_{iFt} \quad (3.1)$$

where  $DR_{iFt}$  denotes the dismissal rate in establishment  $i$  of firm  $F$  at time  $t$ ,  $Dist_i$  is the distance of establishment  $i$  to the firm's headquarters<sup>19</sup> and  $X_{iFt}$  is a vector of establishment-level controls.<sup>20</sup> In estimating this relationship, we consider only secondary establishments and hence exclude headquarters from our sample since the latter are functionally different from the former and may then have lower levels of dismissals for this reason.

Distance to headquarters, however, is most likely to be endogenous. Since plants are plausibly not randomly allocated to locations, the observed correlation between dismissals and distance could be driven, at least partially, by the correlation between distance and unobserved plant characteristics. Formally, the error term in equation (3.1) would then write:  $\varepsilon_{iFt} = \mu_i + u_{iFt}$  where  $\mu_i$  is an establishment fixed effect potentially correlated with  $Dist_i$  and  $u_{iFt}$  is an error term uncorrelated with the regressors in equation (3.1). For example, as underlined by Kalnins

---

estimated correlation coefficient is 0.22, statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence. The source of charity donations and taxable income is the French Ministry of Finance.

<sup>19</sup> We use time-varying dismissal rates although the distance of our establishments to their firm's headquarters is constant over time. We do so because few of our establishments are present in our sample for all quarters over 2003-2007. Now, it is clear that the quality of the information that we have for an establishment increases with the number of quarters over which it is observed. Therefore, collapsing the data at the establishment level would require weighing establishments by the number of quarters for which each of them is observed, in order to give more weight to those for which we have better information. This would be essentially equivalent to what we do, since we cluster standard errors at the establishment level. As a matter of fact, all our results are robust to collapsing the data at the establishment level.

<sup>20</sup> We consider linear rather than log distance since 6% of our secondary establishments are located in the same municipality as the headquarters and have therefore 0 distance to headquarters by construction since our measure of distance is defined across municipalities. However, we check that our relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals still holds if using a log specification.

and Lafontaine (2013), locating an establishment far away from the firm's headquarters induces various types of costs, in particular information asymmetries and monitoring costs. Rational firms locate establishments in order to minimize costs. So, they open and maintain them far away from headquarters only if the new locations offer advantages which are likely to compensate for the costs – e.g. reducing the cost of serving local demand, getting closer to inputs, positive agglomeration externalities, or amenities reducing the cost of labor etc. If these advantages also affect dismissals and are not controlled for in our regressions, OLS estimates of (3.1) are biased.

Whether or not distant plants have a locational advantage is an empirical issue. We investigate this question by checking whether distant plants are more attractive than closer ones in terms of access to local demand. In economic geography, a standard measure of the relative advantage of a location in terms of access to demand is Harris' market potential (Harris, 1954). This is defined as the sum of the purchasing capacities of surrounding local markets weighted by the inverse of their distance – which typically proxies transportation costs to customers. By analogy, we define the market potential of a multi-establishment firm  $F$  as:

$$MPF_F = \sum_k \frac{PC_k}{\min_{i \in F} \{Dist_{ki}\}}$$

where  $PC$  stands for the purchasing capacity of local market  $k$  and  $i$  indexes the establishments of the firm, including the headquarters. In other words, the market potential of firm  $F$  is the sum of the purchasing capacities of each local market weighted by the inverse of the distance of these markets to the closest establishment of the firm. Assuming, for simplicity, that two establishments are not at the same distance from a given local market, the market potential can be rewritten as:

$$MPF_F = \sum_{i \in F} \left( \sum_{k \in \{Dist_{ki} < \min_{j \in F \setminus \{i\}} (Dist_{kj})\}} \frac{PC_k}{Dist_{ki}} \right)$$

where  $F \setminus \{i\}$  stands for the set of establishments of  $F$ , excluding  $i$ . The term in parentheses can be interpreted as the contribution of establishment  $i$  to the market potential of firm  $F$  ( $CMPF$ ), that is:

$$CMPF_i = \sum_{k \in \left\{ \text{Dist}_{ki} < \min_{j \in F \setminus \{i\}} (\text{Dist}_{kj}) \right\}} \frac{PC_k}{\text{Dist}_{ki}}$$

This contribution can be seen as a proxy of the relative size of the local demand served by each establishment.

If the location of establishments is chosen by the firm *only* in order to maximize its market potential, there is no reason for the *CMPF* to be correlated with distance. Therefore, should we find a positive correlation between these variables, this would suggest that establishments located further away from headquarters incur higher costs – e.g. monitoring costs – which have to be compensated by a greater contribution to the firm's market potential. In turn, this would give rise to a selection problem in our sample.

In order to compute contributions to market potential, we capture local markets by employment areas and purchasing capacity by population. In the economic geography literature, purchasing capacity is proxied either by income-based measures (see e.g. Combes et al., 2008) or by population-based measures (see e.g. Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Ioannides and Overman, 2004 and Briant et al., 2010). We use a population-based measure insofar as information on aggregate income is not available at the level of employment areas.

Computing the contributions to market potential with our data requires making another simplifying assumption in order to save computational time, since some of our firms have several thousand establishments.<sup>21</sup> More specifically, we compute the contribution of establishment *i* to the market potential of firm *F*, assuming that all other establishments of *F* are located at the barycenter of their region. Finally, we are limited by the fact that contributions to market potential cannot be computed in a meaningful way with our data for establishments located too close to the sea or to a foreign country. In this case, local demand should indeed include nearby areas in border and/or overseas countries for which, unfortunately, we do not have any information. So, we compute contributions to firms' market potential only for those establishments located in *départements* which have no border with the sea or any foreign country.

Correlations between distance to headquarters and contributions to market potential are presented in Table 1. Whatever the population used to compute the latter (as of 1999 or as of

---

<sup>21</sup> The largest firm in our sample has 3,216 establishments, most of them with fewer than 10 employees. We do not have worker flows for plants smaller than 10 employees (see Section 2). Therefore, plants of this size are not included in our regression analysis. However, we take their location into account to compute the contribution to the firm's market potential of the plants in our sample.

2009), we find a coefficient of correlation as high as 0.32, significant at the 1% level. When variables are defined in deviation from the firm mean, this coefficient is lower but still larger than 0.17 and highly significant at conventional levels. The latter specification is more accurate in our view, given that the greater the number of establishments, the smaller the average *CMPF* and, if population is uniformly distributed across the territory, the shorter the average distance to headquarters. By controlling for the firm mean, we remove these average effects.

The results in Table 1 confirm that establishments located far away from their headquarters are selected on their contribution to market potential. Moreover, there exist other possible sources of endogeneity of distance to headquarters, in addition to selection due to local demand. For instance, if the expansion of the firm follows the Wal-Mart pattern described by Neumark et al. (2008), distant plants are likely to be younger and more volatile, which may generate higher dismissal rates. To address the endogeneity of distance, we need to turn to an instrumental variable (IV) strategy.

This strategy requires that we find an instrument that correlates with distance but is orthogonal both to the contribution of the establishment to the firm's market potential (*CMPF*) and to other plant specific effects that can affect dismissals. We use as an instrument the *potential distance*, defined as the distance to headquarters at which an establishment would have been, had its location (called the *potential location*) been chosen by the firm *only* in order to maximize its contribution to market potential – i.e. disregarding any distance-related costs other than transportation costs to customers – taking the position of the other establishments of the firm as given. In practice, for each firm in our sample, we pick up one of its secondary establishments and remove it. We then consider each employment area in France and consider what would be the contribution to the firm market potential if an additional plant were located there. We take the employment area that maximizes this contribution and measure the distance between its barycenter and the headquarters. We call this "potential distance". We will show in what follows that this instrument is uncorrelated with the determinants of  $\mu_i$ . To do so, we need to be more specific on the way we construct potential distance.

Formally, the potential location (*PL*) is defined as:

$$PL_i = \operatorname{argmax}_h \left\{ \sum_{k \in \{Dist_{kh} < \min_{j \in F \setminus \{i\}} (Dist_{kj})\}} \frac{POP_k}{Dist_{kh}} \right\}$$

and the potential distance is the distance from  $PL$  to the firm's headquarters. Defined in this way, the potential distance is, by construction, unrelated to any determinant of  $\mu_i$  that is not correlated to the  $CMPF$ , except if local population and dismissals are correlated – for example if people tend to migrate away from depressed areas. In order to overcome this problem, scholars in economic geography have used local terrain ruggedness as an exogenous predictor of population – see Combes et al (2010) and Nunn and Puga (2012). The idea is that it is more difficult to settle in more rugged locations. We therefore take the maximum value of ruggedness in our data minus the effective ruggedness of the area as an exogenous proxy of population.<sup>22</sup>  $PL$  then becomes:

$$PL_i = \operatorname{argmax}_h \left\{ \sum_{k \in \{Dist_{kh} < \min_{j \in F \setminus \{i\}} (Dist_{kj})\}} \frac{RUG_{max} - RUG_k}{Dist_{kh}} \right\} \quad (3.2)$$

where  $RUG_k$  denotes ruggedness of the employment area  $k$  and  $RUG_{max}$  is the maximum ruggedness over all employment areas.

When the potential location is constructed as described by equation (3.2), there is no reason that potential distance be correlated with determinants of  $\mu_i$  that are unrelated to local demand, as measured by the  $CMPF$ . In order for the potential distance to be orthogonal to  $\mu_i$ , it is thus enough to show that it is uncorrelated to the  $CMPF$ . This turns out to be the case in our data: as shown in Table 2, whatever the population used to compute the  $CMPF$ , the coefficients of correlation with the potential distance are lower than 0.02 and insignificant at conventional levels.<sup>23</sup> This is not surprising since, as discussed above, if the location of an establishment were chosen by a firm *only* in order to maximize its market potential, there would be no reason for the  $CMPF$  of this establishment to be correlated with its distance to headquarters.

<sup>22</sup> Following Combes et al (2010), local terrain ruggedness is defined here as the mode of maximum altitudes across all pixels in an employment area minus the mode of minimum altitudes, using pixels of 1km by 1km. The correlation between ruggedness and population across employment areas is significant at the 1% level in our data.

<sup>23</sup> Errors are clustered at the region-by-firm level in Table 2 because, given the procedure we use to compute potential distance, for any firm with many establishments in a given region, the potential distance is virtually the same for all establishments of that firm in that region.

One may still worry that potential distance could be a weak instrument. As shown in Figure 2, this is not the case. For some firms in our sample, all establishments have the same potential location so that potential distance in deviation from the firm mean is 0 and hence uncorrelated with actual distance. However, these turn out to be a limited number, so that the overall correlation between potential and actual distances is quite strong.

### 3.2 The role of social pressure

Once established that distance to headquarters has a positive impact on dismissals in secondary establishments, we investigate the role of local social pressure at headquarters in generating this relation. As suggested by the simple model proposed in Section 1, if social pressure is a key determinant of the distance-dismissal relationship, we expect the latter to be stronger the greater the firm visibility at headquarters and the lower the generosity of the local community.

As a first step, we test whether the impact of distance on dismissals varies according to firm visibility at headquarters. In order to do so, we estimate the following equation:

$$DR_{iFt} = \beta_{LV}Dist_i * LV_F + \beta_{HV}Dist_i * HV_F + X_{iFt}\gamma + D_t + D_F + \varepsilon_{iFt} \quad (3.3)$$

where  $LV_F$  and  $HV_F$  denote low and high visibility of the firm at the headquarters, respectively. If more visible firms are more sensitive to social pressure, we expect  $\beta_{HV}$  to be larger than  $\beta_{LV}$ .

As a second step, we focus on the impact of generosity. We investigate whether the positive relationship between dismissals and distance to headquarters is stronger when firms' headquarters are located in areas where the local community is more selfish (less generous). We estimate:

$$DR_{iFt} = \beta_{LG}Dist_i * LG_F + \beta_{HG}Dist_i * HG_F + X_{iFt}\gamma + D_t + D_F + \varepsilon_{iFt} \quad (3.4)$$

where  $LG_F$  and  $HG_F$  respectively denote low and high generosity of the community in which the firm's headquarters are located, and where we expect that  $\beta_{LG} > \beta_{HG}$ .

We also check whether the impact of firm visibility on the positive relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals increases as the local community of the firm's headquarters gets less generous. More specifically, we estimate:

$$DR_{iFt} = \beta_{LG_{LV}}Dist_i * LG_F * LV_F + \beta_{LG_{HV}}Dist_i * LG_F * HV_F + \beta_{HG_{LV}}Dist_i * HG_F * LV_F + \beta_{HG_{HV}}Dist_i * HG_F * HV_F + X_{iFt}\gamma + D_t + D_F + \varepsilon_{iFt} \quad (3.5)$$

and expect  $\beta_{LG_{HV}}$  to be positive and larger than any other  $\beta$  coefficient.

## 4. Results

### 4.1 Dismissals and distance to headquarters

The impact of distance to headquarters on dismissals – see equation (3.1) – is first estimated by OLS, using a “selection on observables” approach, which tries to capture plant-specific effects with a vector of observables. Our baseline specification includes time and firm dummies and a number of establishment characteristics, namely: industry and employment-area dummies, establishment size and age dummies, gender and occupational structure of the workforce, firm size in the establishment's local labor market (i.e. the employment area where the establishment is located) and time-varying unemployment rates in the employment area. We control for employment-area dummies since, together with firm dummies, they capture the relative attractiveness of the establishment's location as compared to the headquarters'. Establishment size is important because large establishments may be located closer to headquarters and because it may be easier for them to reallocate workers internally and hence avoid dismissals. Moreover, transfers across plants within the same local labor market are probably not resisted by workers so that relocating unnecessary workers is easier for the firm if it is of large size in the area where the establishment is located. This is why we also control for firm size in the establishment's employment area. Controlling for establishment age is motivated by the fact that establishments located further away from headquarters are likely to be younger while their activity may be more volatile<sup>24</sup> and hence induce more dismissals. We control for workforce characteristics because the frequency of dismissals may differ across gender and/or occupation. Local unemployment rates capture the fact that, beyond fixed local labor market characteristics, establishments located further away from headquarters may be affected by negative temporary shocks and hence dismiss more workers.

The OLS estimates obtained with this specification are presented in Table 3 – col (1). Distance to headquarters has a positive and significant effect on dismissals: when the former increases by 100 km, dismissals increase by 0.03 percentage points – that is, by 3.33% as measured at the sample average. Note that if we add headquarters to our sample and include a dummy variable for them in the baseline specification, our results are virtually unchanged – see Table 3 – col (2).

---

<sup>24</sup> On the relationship between age and volatility, see Haltiwanger et al. (2013).

A problem with “selection on observables” – the approach taken in the first two columns of Table 3 – is that the omission of plant-specific effects that are correlated both with distance and with dismissals may produce biased estimates of the true correlation between distance and dismissals. In order to deal with this problem, we use the IV strategy described in section 3.1, where the *actual distance* to headquarters is instrumented by the *potential distance* at which the establishment would have been located had its location been chosen by the firm *only* to maximize its contribution to market potential.

This instrument, however, is likely to be affected by substantial measurement error for plants located in *départements* that are on the seaside or have borders with foreign countries. This is due to the fact that, in these locations, the contribution to the firm market potential (*CMPF*) is heavily underestimated since local demand depends to a large extent on foreign countries on which we have no information. So, for any plant in these locations, potential distance computed making use of the *CMPF* – see Section 3.1 – is affected by major mis-measurement.<sup>25</sup> As a consequence, when including these locations in our sample, we find that the estimated relationship between potential and actual distance is non-monotonic,<sup>26</sup> which makes the instrument invalid on this sample – see e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2009). In contrast, there is no evidence of any non-linearity when excluding plants located in *départements* that are on the seaside or have borders with foreign countries.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, we restrict our IV estimation to this reduced sample.

We first check this sample restriction does not modify our baseline OLS results. As shown in column (3) of Table 3, the impact of distance to headquarters on dismissals is still positive and significant at the 1% level. The first stage of our IV estimate is provided in column (4): the effect of potential distance on actual distance is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. As regards the second stage – col (5) – we find that the estimated

---

<sup>25</sup> It is useful to illustrate this point further with an example. Assume that a firm has its headquarters in Paris and two plants, one in the very center of France – say, Clermont-Ferrand – and the other close to the Belgian border, – say, in Lille. If we were to correctly compute the potential location associated with the second plant, we should consider as relevant local markets not only the French but also the Belgian employment areas bordering the French territory. By omitting these densely-populated Belgian areas, for which we have no data, we may identify a location in the South of France as the potential location, whereas if we had been able to include these areas in our computation, the potential location would have been close to Lille. In the case of Clermont-Ferrand, instead, the choice of the potential location is much less likely to be affected by the omission of border Belgian areas.

<sup>26</sup> When regressing actual on potential distance and its square on the sample of plants located in border and sea *départements* and using the same controls as in Table 3, the point estimate on potential distance is -0.278 (with standard error 0.075) and that of potential distance squared is 0.000884 (with standard error 0.000125). This suggests that the relationship between potential and actual distance changes sign at 157km which is close to the average potential distance in this sample.

<sup>27</sup> When regressing actual distance on any polynomial in potential distance up to the 5<sup>th</sup> order, none of the terms of order higher than 1 is ever significant at conventional levels.

coefficient of distance is very close to the coefficient estimated by OLS (0.064 versus 0.062)<sup>28</sup> and statistically significant at the 10% level.<sup>29</sup> The finding that the IV point estimate is almost identical to the OLS estimate suggests that selection on observables as implemented in columns (1)-(3) of the table does a reasonably good job in capturing the causal effect of distance on dismissals. This is confirmed by the Hausman test (P-value = 0.949), which does not reject the null hypothesis that actual distance is exogenous in specification (3). This is not surprising since including very detailed employment-area and firm dummies enables us to control for most sources of locational advantage. Based on this result, in the rest of the paper, we will rely on our baseline OLS specification in order to be able to use all *départements* in our sample, including those with borders either with foreign countries or with the sea.

In what follows, we present a number of robustness checks of the baseline specification. So far, we have used the linear distance to headquarters as key variable of interest, rather than its log. We have done so because about 6% of the establishments in our sample are located in the same municipality as their headquarters (and hence have zero distance to headquarters) – see footnote 17. Moreover, we want to capture the fact that increasing distance from 150 to 300 km from headquarters is likely to have a larger impact on dismissals as compared to increasing it from 1.5 to 3 km as would be implied by a log specification. However, as shown in Appendix Table A4 – col (1), the positive and significant impact of distance to headquarters on dismissals is robust to using the log rather than linear distance.

A potential concern is that our results could be driven by the large proportion of zero dismissal rates in our sample and the fact that equation (3.1) does not account for the censoring of the distribution of dismissal rates at 0. We address this problem by estimating a Tobit model in which equation (3.1) is re-written in terms of latent dismissal propensities. We use the Mundlak transformation to control for firm fixed effects and obtain similar results – see Table A4 – col (2). The positive effect of distance on dismissals is also robust to removing the Paris region (Ile-de-France), where a large proportion (37.5%) of the headquarters are concentrated – see col (3). All the results presented in the next section (4.2) are also robust to the specifications used in Appendix Table A4, i.e. using log instead of linear distance,

---

<sup>28</sup> One could still worry that dropping border and sea *départements* might not be enough to avoid that our instrument be affected by significant measurement error. However, if we re-run our estimates excluding border and sea regions rather than *départements* – using therefore a much smaller sample of observations located further away from these borders and hence where measurement issues are even milder – we obtain similar results. This is not surprising since the contribution of each employment area to the *CMPF* is weighted by the inverse of distance – see equation (3.2) – so that the measurement error due to the omission of foreign markets decreases quickly when moving away from the sea and borders.

<sup>29</sup> The lower level of significance of this coefficient is likely to reflect the inefficiency of 2SLS estimates.

estimating a tobit model or removing the Ile-de-France region.

The relatively low level of dismissals at short distances from headquarters could be compensated by other types of separations. We examine the effects of distance on quits, retirement, trial-period and fixed-term-contract terminations, but find very few significant results – see Appendix Table A5. On the one hand, end of trial period, fixed-term-contract terminations and retirement do not vary with the distance to the headquarters. On the other hand, quits tend to increase with distance but the effect is very small (the point estimate is one third of that of dismissals whereas the average rate of quits is almost twice as large as that of dismissals – see Appendix Table A3) and weakly significant despite the large size of our sample.<sup>30</sup>

We have established that plants located further away from their headquarters have higher dismissal rates. In the remainder of the paper we investigate the role of social pressure at headquarters in generating such geographical pattern of dismissals.

#### *4.2 Social pressure and dismissals*

If the positive impact of distance on dismissal rates results from social pressure, it should be stronger wherever the firm represents a larger share of employment in the local labor market (i.e. the employment area) where its headquarters are located. In that case, the firm is indeed more visible in the community of its headquarters which increases the incentive of the CEO to avoid painful adjustments in closely-located establishments. We test this prediction by estimating equation (3.3). As shown in Table 4 – col (1), the impact of distance to headquarters on dismissals is significantly larger for high-visibility than for low-visibility firms. When we test whether the estimated coefficients are statistically different, we cannot reject the null, suggesting that whenever firms are more visible in the area where their headquarters are located, they are more reluctant to fire workers close to headquarters.

One source of concern, however, is that our results might be driven by the fact that firms which are highly visible at headquarters are simply large firms in the local area of their headquarters (or in France as a whole). If unions are more powerful where firms are larger, the stronger relationship between distance and dismissals for high-visibility firms could be due to the ability of unions to avoid local dismissals rather than to the visibility of the firm

---

<sup>30</sup> In addition, we find that hiring on permanent contracts increases with the distance to headquarters. We estimate that increasing distance by 100 km raises the hiring rate by 5.5 percentage points (with a standard error of 1.6 percentage points). This is consistent with our theoretical model which predicts that social pressure at headquarters makes employment more volatile in establishments located further away from their headquarters.

and local social pressure arising from outside the firm. Table 4 shows that this alternative interpretation is not supported by our data: the impact of distance on dismissals remains much larger for firms with high visibility at headquarters than for firms with low visibility, even when controlling for the interaction between distance to headquarters and total (absolute) firm size in the employment area of the headquarters – see column (2) – or, alternatively, for the interaction between distance to HQ and total firm size in France as a whole – see column (3).

Another concern could arise if highly visible firms are also more concentrated at headquarters. If CEOs dispose of better-quality information wherever firms' activities are more concentrated, they may be more able to use internal reallocations rather than dismissals to adjust employment at short distances, which may induce a spurious correlation between visibility and the slope of the distance-dismissal relationship. As evidenced in Table 4 – col (4), this potential adjustment mechanism does not explain our results, since the distance-dismissal relationship remains stronger when firms are highly visible at headquarters, even after controlling for the interaction between distance and firm concentration in the employment area of the headquarters – with concentration defined as the ratio of firm employment in the local labor market of its headquarters to total firm employment in France.

Our hypothesis is that what matters for dismissal decisions is the social pressure borne by the CEO in her local environment. If this is true, only firm visibility *at headquarters* should matter, and dismissals should be essentially unaffected by firm visibility in other employment areas. We test this hypothesis by implementing a placebo test. We define as placebo headquarters, the largest establishment located in the employment area where the firm is the most visible (excluding that of the true headquarters).<sup>31</sup> We then estimate equation (3.3) using these placebo headquarters (and excluding the true ones). We find no significant impact on dismissals of either the distance to the placebo headquarters – see Appendix Table A6, col (1) – or of distance interacted with firm visibility at the placebo headquarters – col (2). Results do not vary if we define as placebo headquarters a secondary establishment randomly drawn from all the establishments of the firm located outside the employment area of the true headquarters – see Table A6, cols (3) and (4). These estimates suggest that firm visibility in the local labor market of secondary establishments does not affect dismissals whereas visibility at headquarters does.

These results are supportive of the idea formalized in our stylized model that establishments located further away from headquarters experience higher dismissal rates, because CEOs find

---

<sup>31</sup> For 56% of our firms, the employment area where the firm is the most visible is not that of the headquarters.

it more costly to fire workers at short distances from headquarters due to the social pressure in their local environment. One mechanism likely to account for this effect is that people living in the area of the headquarters put pressure on CEOs so as to avoid that they dismiss people living close to this area, considering that this would have negative social consequences in their neighborhood. If this is the case, the relationship between distance and dismissals hinges on the fact that people living close to headquarters are selfish so that they value dismissals at short distance more negatively than dismissals far away, because the former are more likely to affect them. To test this assumption, we estimate equation (3.4) using the 1887 ratio of *département*-level charity donations to GDP as an indicator of generosity. We find that the positive impact of distance on dismissals is significant for firms with headquarters located both in low and high-generosity *départements*, but that the effect is significantly larger for low-generosity than for high-generosity *départements* – see Table 5, col (1).

It has been shown in the literature on charity that the total amount of charitable giving is greater in communities with a larger number of high-income individuals (Card et al., 2010). One potential concern is that our measure of generosity might simply capture average income, and therefore the relative level of economic development of the *départements*, which might be persistent over time. To the extent that economic development might correlate with dismissals, this could bias our results. In order to dispel this doubt, we include in our specification the interaction between distance and taxable income per capita as measured in 2004 in the *département* where the headquarters are located<sup>32</sup> – see Table 5, col (2). Our results are virtually unchanged, which suggests that the ratio of charity donations to GDP does capture local generosity rather than economic development. Similarly, our generosity variable could capture a more general social-capital effect. To control for this, we include in our specification the interaction between distance and a standard measure of social capital: the turnout rate at the first round of the parliamentary elections as measured in 2002 in the *département* where the headquarters are located. The results are unaffected, with the difference in coefficients between high and low generosity remaining significant at the 7% level.<sup>33</sup>

These results are consistent with an interpretation of the effect of distance as reflecting local social pressure: in areas where the local community is selfish, people care about dismissals to

---

<sup>32</sup> Source: French Ministry of Finance.

<sup>33</sup> The coefficient on distance interacted with low generosity is 0.093 (with standard error 0.030) while that on distance interacted with high generosity is 0.035 (with standard error 0.010). The p-value of the test that estimated coefficients are equal is 0.067. The source of turnout rates is the French Ministry of the Interior.

the extent that they take place close by and threaten them directly. As a consequence, they put pressure on CEOs to shift dismissals away from local areas near the headquarters. In more altruistic communities, this effect is significantly smaller. To make sure that what matters is generosity at *headquarters* rather than where the plant is located, we run the same type of placebo test as for visibility. We first define as placebo headquarters, the largest establishment of the firm located in the least generous *département* where the firm is present (excluding the *département* of the true headquarters). When estimating equation (3.4) using these placebo headquarters, we find no significant impact on dismissals of either the distance to the placebo headquarters – see Appendix Table A7, col (1) – or of distance interacted with generosity at the placebo headquarters – col (2). Results are identical if we choose as placebo headquarters a secondary establishment randomly drawn from all the establishments of the firm excluding the true headquarters – see Table A7, cols (3) and (4). As in the case of visibility, these findings suggest that what matters for dismissals is indeed generosity at headquarters rather than in other *départements*.

An alternative measure of generosity could be based on blood donation. This is often used in order to capture social capital, but it could actually be seen as a measure of generosity since it is based on a gift, and a very special one since it is likely to help others survive. To the extent that we control for social capital using electoral turnout rates, we argue that blood donation can be considered as a valuable measure of generosity in our set-up. Given that information on the volume of blood donation at the local level is not freely available to researchers in France, we hand-collected the number of blood-donation associations at the municipality level in 2013. We aggregated them at the level of employment areas and computed the ratio to potential blood donors – i.e. individuals aged 18 and above.<sup>34</sup> Here again, in the empirical analysis, we consider that headquarters are located in high-generosity *départements* when the latter belong to the upper 25% of the distribution of per capita blood-donation associations. Symmetrically, headquarters are considered to be located in low-generosity *départements* when the latter belong to the bottom 75% of the distribution. Let us underline that this measure of generosity is more likely to be endogenous than the one based on charity as measured in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. An attempt to control for this consists in controlling for the interaction between distance to headquarters and the unemployment rate in the local labor market of the headquarters. Although not dealing with all potential sources of endogeneity, this ensures that our results are not driven by the fact that local communities close to

---

<sup>34</sup> We actually computed the ratio of blood-donation associations to the population aged 15 and above since we don't have information on the number of individuals older than 18 at the employment-area level.

headquarters tend to be more generous when the local economy is doing well hence unemployment is low. When regressing dismissal rates on distance to headquarters interacted with both low and high blood donation at headquarters – along with all our standard controls including distance interacted with turnout rates and distance interacted with local unemployment rates – our findings are similar to those obtained with charity. The positive impact of distance on dismissals is positive and significant only for firms whose headquarters are located in a local labor market characterized by low generosity.<sup>35</sup> For firms with headquarters located in areas with many blood-donation associations, the impact of distance on dismissals is even negative, although insignificant at conventional levels.<sup>36</sup> So, even if based on a less satisfactory measure of generosity, the results obtained with blood-donation confirm that social pressure is indeed a key factor in accounting for the distance-dismissal relationship: wherever people are less generous, they put more pressure on CEOs to fire people far away rather than closer to headquarters, whereas when local communities are more altruistic this effect is much smaller.

A last piece of evidence regarding social pressure comes from interacting firm visibility close to headquarters with the generosity of the local community. If social pressure is an important determinant of dismissals, the positive impact of distance should be highest for firms which represent a large proportion of employment in the local labor market of their headquarters *and* whose headquarters are located in a more selfish community – see equation (3.5). As shown in Table 5, cols (3) and (4), this implication is borne out by our estimates: we find that, when high visibility combines with low generosity, the effect of increasing distance by 100 km on dismissals is largest (0.16 percentage points) and significantly higher than for any other combination of visibility and generosity. We interpret these results as indicating that social pressure arising from the local community is a key factor explaining why dismissals are fewer at shorter distance from a firm's headquarters.

## 5. Discussion of alternative explanations

Aside from local social pressure, there are other candidate explanations for the positive relationship between distance and dismissals. We discuss them in turn and show that none of them can account for all our findings.

---

<sup>35</sup> The point estimate on the distance\*low generosity interaction is 0.050 with a point estimate of 0.012.

<sup>36</sup> The point estimate on the distance\*high generosity interaction is -0.042 with a point estimate of 0.074.

### *5.1 Public subsidies*

One reason for lower dismissal rates in establishments closer to headquarters could have to do with public subsidies. In France, most local subsidies to economic activity are granted by regional authorities to firms rather than establishments – which are not profit centers. Subsidies may be granted under local social pressure which would be consistent with our explanation. But, they may also be motivated by some form of corruption if politicians exchange these subsidies for financial support from firms for their electoral campaigns. If subsidies reduce the probability of firm downsizing, this could account for our findings. To disentangle local social pressure from the effect of public subsidies, we re-estimate our empirical models using only the sub-sample of establishments located outside the region of the headquarters. By so doing, we exclude the main catchment areas of local politicians. The results presented in Appendix Table A8 confirm on this subsample that the positive effect of distance on dismissals is much larger for firms with a high visibility in the local labor market of their headquarters than for firms with low visibility – see column (1). Similarly, the effect of distance is stronger for firms with headquarters located in low-generosity areas – see column (2). We also confirm that the effect of distance on dismissals is much larger for firms with high visibility and headquarters located in low-generosity areas than for any other type of firms and local communities – see column (3). Since our key effects do not disappear outside the region of the headquarters, we conclude that the political use of public subsidies cannot be the only mechanism at play.

### *5.2 Monitoring costs*

If establishments located far away from headquarters have higher monitoring costs, this may negatively affect their performance hence increase dismissals. However, this mechanism cannot explain why the impact of distance to headquarters on dismissals is found to increase with the visibility of the firm in the local community of its headquarters, even after controlling for the interaction between distance and firm concentration in the employment area of the headquarters. We therefore rule out that monitoring costs are the only driving factor behind the relationship we have uncovered between distance and dismissals.

### *5.3 Managerial entrenchment*

Fewer dismissals at short distances could also be due to within-firm social pressure if entrenched managers refrain from firing people with whom they interact on a regular basis and if interactions are more frequent at short distances. In this case, however, the distance

effect should not vary with the firm's visibility at headquarters, except if entrenchment increases with firm size, given that the latter is correlated with visibility. However, as shown in Table 4 – col (3) – the finding that the impact of distance on dismissals is stronger when firms are highly visible at headquarters is robust to controlling for the interaction between distance to headquarters and overall firm size in France.

#### *5.4 Sorting of workers and/or managers*

Good workers may self-select into establishments close to headquarters because career prospects are better. For the same reason, good managers may wish to locate close to headquarters while bad ones may be forced to stay further away. If good workers are less likely to be dismissed and/or good managers are better at making their establishments successful – thereby making dismissals unnecessary –, this could account for the distance-dismissal relationship. In addition, this effect is likely to vary with firm visibility at headquarters if within-firm career prospects are better when firms are larger. However, this cannot be the main explanation since we show that our results are robust to conditioning on firm size in the employment area of the headquarters interacted with distance.

Good workers and managers may also self-select where the firm is more visible if they expect to have better external job opportunities when coming from a firm that is one of the main actors in its local environment. If this were a key explanation, however, workers should self-select not only in establishments close to headquarters, but also in all establishments located in any other area where the firm is highly visible. This would, in turn, generate a positive relationship between dismissals and the distance to any location where the firm is highly visible. The results from our placebo tests indicate that this is not the case: what matters for dismissals is visibility at headquarters, while visibility in other employment areas turns out to have no significant effect. Moreover, none of these sorting mechanisms can explain why the effect of distance varies with the degree of generosity of the local community where the headquarters are located.

#### *5.5 Place attachment*

The literature in environmental psychology suggests that individuals are attached to their place of origin. Building on this argument, Yonker (2013) suggests that dismissals may be less numerous close to the CEO's place of origin. Moreover, Yonker (2012) provides evidence that, even in the USA, CEOs tend to be hired locally. If this is the case, dismissals should be less frequent close to headquarters where CEOs live and may come from. However, this effect

should not vary with firm visibility. If any, it should go in the opposite direction: smaller firms are indeed more likely to have CEOs with local origin so that the relationship between distance and dismissals should be stronger where firms are less visible.

#### *5.6 Altruistic attitudes of CEOs independent of social pressure*

Socially-concerned CEOs are aware that the negative social consequences of high dismissal rates are likely to be stronger wherever their firm represents a larger share of local employment. This concern may explain why they refrain from firing workers in the employment area of the headquarters when their company is highly visible. CEOs' attitudes and concerns do not explain, however, why the relationship between distance and dismissals varies according to the generosity of the local community of the headquarters. Moreover, dismissals should be lower wherever the firm accounts for a large proportion of local employment, not just at headquarters, which is not supported by the results from our placebo test.

#### *5.7 All the above explanations taken together*

We have shown that, taken separately, the alternative mechanisms considered in this section cannot account for the different facets of the relationship between distance and dismissals uncovered by our empirical analysis. Can they do so jointly? The answer to this question turns out to be negative since none of these explanations can account for the fact that, even outside the region of the headquarters, the relationship between distance and dismissals is positive and stronger for high-visibility firms whose headquarters are located in areas with more selfish local communities.

### **Conclusion**

In this paper, we have shown that firms are sensitive to social pressure in the local environment where their headquarters are located, which induces them to refrain from dismissing at short distance from headquarters. More specifically, using French linked employer-employee data, we have found that dismissal rates are higher in secondary establishments located further away from headquarters than in those located closer. This result holds even after controlling for the possible endogeneity of the distance to headquarters. We also find that the positive effect of distance on dismissals increases with the firm's share of total employment in the local labor market of its headquarters. This suggests that wherever

firms are more visible at headquarters, they are more reluctant to fire closely-located workers. This is consistent with the idea that CEOs are under local social pressure in their community to reduce as much as possible dismissals in their area. Moreover, this effect is stronger the greater the degree of selfishness of the local community of the headquarters. This suggests that local social pressure at headquarters is a key determinant of the positive relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals. Correspondingly, we show that our results cannot be entirely accounted for by the other explanations of the positive relationship between distance and dismissals proposed in the literature.

Our findings suggest that social pressure exerted in the community of their headquarters has an important impact on the way firms accommodate negative shocks, in particular in terms of employment downsizing. The natural question to ask is then: who exactly is affected by social pressure? Is it the owner of the firm or the CEO? If it is the CEO, and the CEO is not one of the main shareholders of the firm, her decisions may not be profit maximizing. In this case, the relationship between distance and dismissals is likely to be stronger the weaker the firm's governance. Whilst our data do not contain information on firm governance, we believe that understanding how governance affects employment decisions when the CEO is exposed to local social pressure is a challenging avenue for further research.

By focusing on firms registered in France, our paper has nothing to say on the effects of social pressure on the employment adjustment of multinational companies. Do multinational firms also react to local social pressure in their home country? Do they tend to shift the burden of painful employment adjustments onto subsidiaries located in foreign countries? This question is of particular relevance given the increasing level of globalization of advanced economies. Investigating these effects on an international scale would require getting access to appropriate plant-level data for several countries. While we are unaware of the existence of such data, we believe that investigating this issue would be of major importance to understand how the presence of multinational companies may affect the resilience of countries to negative economic shocks.

## References


- Andreoni James and B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009, "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects", *Econometrica*, 77(5), pp. 1607-1636.
- Andreoni James and Ragan Petrie, 2004, "Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising", *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(7-8), pp. 1605–1623.
- Angrist, Joshua, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2009, *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*, Princeton University Press.
- Ariely Dan, Anat Bracha, and Stephan Meier, 2009, "Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially", *American Economic Review*, 99(1), pp. 544-555.
- Baron, David, 2011, "Credence attributes, voluntary organizations, and social pressure", *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(11-12), pp. 1331-1338.
- Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, 2010, "Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility", *Economica*, 77(305), pp. 1-19.
- Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003, "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences", *The Journal of Political Economy*, 111(5), pp. 1043-1075.
- Bottazzi, Laura, and Giovanni Peri, 2003, "Innovation and Spillovers in Regions: Evidence from European Patent Data", *European Economic Review*, 47(4), pp. 687-710.
- Briant, Anthony, Pierre-Philippe Combes and Miren Lafourcade, 2010, "Dots to boxes: Do the size and shape of geographical units jeopardize economic geography estimations?", *Journal of Urban Economics*, 67(3), pp. 287–302.
- Cahuc, Pierre, and André Zylberberg, 2004, *Labor Economics*, Cambridge (Mass), The MIT Press.
- Cahuc, Pierre, and André Zylberberg, 2008, "Optimum Taxation and Layoff Taxes", *Journal of Public Economics*, 92 (10-11), pp. 2003-2019.
- Card David, Kevin F. Hallock and Enrico Moretti, 2010, "The Geography of Giving: the Effect of Corporate Headquarters on Local Charities", *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(3-4), pp. 222-234.
- Combes, Pierre-Philippe, Thierry Mayer and Jean-François Thisse, 2008, *Economic Geography*, Princeton University Press.
- Combes, Pierre-Philippe, Gilles Duranton, Laurent Gobillon and Sébastien Roux, 2010, "Estimating agglomeration Economies with History, Geology, and Worker Effects", in *Agglomeration Economics*, Edward L. Glaeser (ed.), NBER, Cambridge, MA, pp. 15-66.
- Cronqvist, Henrik, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd and Jonas Vlachos, 2009, "Do Entrenched Managers Pay their Workers More?", *The Journal of Finance*, 64(1), pp. 309-39.
- D'Aurizio Leandro and Livio Romano, 2013, "Family Firms and the Great Recession: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?", Bank of Italy Working Papers, n°905.
- Davis, Steven, Jason Faberman and John Haltiwanger, 2006, "The flow approach to labor markets: New data sources and micro-macro links", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(3), pp. 3-26.

- Della Vigna Stefano, John List and Ulrike Malmendier, 2012, "Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(1), pp. 1-55.
- Filiz-Ozbay Emel and Erkut Filiz-Ozbay, 2014, "Effect of an audience in public goods provision", *Experimental Economics*, 17(2), pp. 200-214.
- Fontvieille, Louis, 1982, "Evolution et croissance de l'administration départementale française 1815-1974", *Economie et Sociétés*, Série AF, 14, pp. 149-173.
- Frey, Bruno S., Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Reiner Eichenberger, 1996, "The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals", *The Journal of Political Economy*, 104(6), pp. 1297-1313.
- Garicano Luis, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta and Candice Prendergast, 2005, "Favoritism under Social Pressure", *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 87(2), pp. 208–216.
- Giroud Xavier, 2013, "Proximity and Investment: Evidence from Plant-Level Data", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), pp. 861-915.
- Giroud Xavier and Holger Mueller, 2010, "Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries?", *Journal of Financial Economics*, 95(3), pp. 312-331.
- Giroud Xavier and Holger Mueller, 2014, "Capital and Labor Reallocation within Firms", *Journal of Finance*, forthcoming.
- Harris, Chauncy D., 1954, "The market as a factor in the localization of industry in the United States", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 44(4), pp. 315-348.
- Haltiwanger, John, Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda, 2013, "Who Creates Jobs? Small versus Large versus Young", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 95(2), pp. 347-361.
- Ioannides, Yannis and Henry G. Overman, 2004, "Spatial evolution of the US urban system", *Journal of Economic Geography*, 4 (2), pp. 1468-2710.
- Kalnins, Arturs, and Francine Lafontaine, 2013, "Too Far Away? The Effect of Distance to Headquarters on Business Establishment Performance", *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 5(3), pp. 157-79.
- Landier, Augustin, Vinay Nair and Julie Wulf, 2009, "Trade-offs in Staying Close: Corporate Decision Making and Geographic Dispersion", *Review of Financial Studies*, 22(3), pp. 1119-1148.
- Luo, Xueming and C. B. Bhattacharya, 2006, "Corporate Social Responsibility, Customer Satisfaction, and Market Value", *Journal of Marketing*, 70(4), pp. 1-18.
- Minni, Claude, 2013, "Les ruptures conventionnelles de 2008 à 2012", *DARES Analyses*, n°031.
- Neumark, David, Junfu Zhang and Stephen Ciccarella, 2008, "The effects of Wal-Mart on local labor markets", *Journal of Urban Economics*, 63(2), pp. 405-430.
- Nunn, Nathan and Diego Puga, 2012, "Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(1), pp. 20-36.
- Schmitz Jan and Jan Schrader, 2013, "Corporate Social Responsibility: a Microeconomic Review of the Literature", *Journal of Economic Surveys*, DOI: 10.1111/joes.12043.
- Soetevent Adriaan, 2011, " Payment Choice, Image Motivation and Contributions to Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment", *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(1), pp. 180-205.

Yonker, Scott E., 2012, "Geography and the Market for CEOs", mimeo, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.

Yonker, Scott E., 2013, "Do local managers give labor an edge?", CES Research Paper 13-16, U.S. Census Bureau.

**Figure 1**




where:

$$\tilde{w}_i(G) = w + \lambda_G b_i + (r + \lambda_G) c_h$$

$$\tilde{w}_i(B) = w - \lambda_B c_h - (r + \lambda_B) b_i$$

**Figure 2**  
**Potential and Actual Distances to Headquarters**  
(in deviation from firm mean)



## Tables

**Table 1 - Correlations between distance to headquarters and contribution to market potential.**

	(1) Population 1999	(2) Population 2009
Levels	0.315***	0.319***
Deviation from firm average	0.173***	0.178***

Notes: (1) CMPF are based on 1999 and 2009 population data in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. (2) Sample excluding seaside and border *départements*. (3) Significance obtained adjusting for clustering at the region\*firm level. (4) \*\*\* p<0.01.

**Table 2 - Correlation between potential distance to headquarters and contribution to market potential.**

	(1) Population 1999	(2) Population 2009
	0.014 (0. 729)	0.018 (0. 661)

Notes: (1) CMPF is based on 1999 and 2009 population data in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. (2) Sample excluding sea and border *départements*. (3) Variables in deviation from the firm average. (4) p-values in parentheses. Significance obtained adjusting for clustering at the region\*firm level.

**Table 3 Distance to headquarters (HQ) and dismissals in secondary establishments 2003-2007**

Method	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) IV-1 <sup>st</sup> stage	(5) IV-2 <sup>nd</sup> stage
Sample	Full	Full + HQs	No sea & border	No sea & border	No sea & border
Dependent variable	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Distance to HQ	Dismissal rate
Distance to headquarters	0.0326*** (0.0112)	0.0374*** (0.0093)	0.0617*** (0.0171)		0.0639* (0.0377)
Potential distance to HQ				0.522*** (0.0421)	
Headquarters dummy		-24.95*** (3.26)			
Observations	272,021	410,484	145,306	145,306	145,306
R-squared	0.114	0.132	0.186	0.811	0.008
F-test on instrument					157.5
Hausman test (P-value)					0.949
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) In all columns, except col. 4, the dependent variable is the quarterly dismissal rate in percentage multiplied by 100. (2) Control variables include: firm, industry, time and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies, and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. (3) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (4) IV models are estimated with 2SLS estimators. (5) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4: Interactions between distance to headquarters and firm visibility in the employment area of the headquarters 2003-2007**

Specification	(1) Baseline	(2) Baseline + Distance * total firm size in HQ's area	(3) Baseline + Distance * overall firm size in France	(4) Baseline + Distance * firm concentration in HQ's area
Dependent variable	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate
Distance*Low visibility	0.029*** (0.011)	0.048* (0.026)	0.078** (0.037)	0.028** (0.011)
Distance*High visibility	0.073*** (0.013)	0.127*** (0.033)	0.139*** (0.047)	0.072*** (0.013)
Observations	238,605	238,605	238,605	238,605
R-squared	0.110	0.111	0.111	0.110
Dist*High visibility – Dist*Low visibility (F-stat)	12.87***	13.13***	8.80***	12.90***
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) Dismissal rates are expressed in percentage multiplied by 100. (2) Total firm size in the employment area of the headquarters is divided in 6 classes, each of them corresponding to a dummy variable in our specification. Overall firm size in France is divided in 5 classes. (3) Visibility is measured as the share of the firm in the headquarters' employment area expressed as a percentage of total employment in the area. High visibility is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm's share of local employment belongs to the upper 25% of the visibility distribution and 0 otherwise. Low visibility is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the lower 75% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. (4) Control variables include: industry, time, firm and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (6) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5: Interactions between distance to headquarters and the level of generosity in the *département* of the headquarters 2003-2007**

Dependent variable	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate
Distance*Low generosity	0.092*** (0.031)	0.095*** (0.031)		
Distance*High generosity	0.035*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)		
Distance*Low generosity*High visibility			0.155*** (0.053)	0.159*** (0.052)
Distance*Low generosity*Low visibility			0.039 (0.036)	0.043 (0.036)
Distance*High generosity*High visibility			0.056*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.011)
Distance*High generosity*Low visibility			0.026** (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)
p-value (High generosity - Low generosity)	0.072	0.056		
p-value (LowGen*HighVis - LowGen*LowVis)			0.068	0.068
p-value (LowGen *HighVis - HighGen*HighVis)			0.070	0.058
p-value (LowGen *HighVis - HighGen*LowVis)			0.018	0.014
Observations	231,310	231,310	231,310	231,310
R-squared	0.111	0.111	0.111	0.111
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Distance*income per capita in HQ's <i>département</i>	no	yes	no	yes

Notes: (1) Dismissal rates are expressed in percentage multiplied by 100. (2) Generosity is proxied by the ratio of total charity donations in 1887 to *département*-level GDP. In our regressions, high-generosity is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the *département* of the headquarters belongs to the upper 25% of the charity distribution and 0 otherwise. Symmetrically, headquarters are considered to be located in low-generosity *départements* if the latter belong to the bottom 75% of the distribution. (3) Visibility is measured as the share of the firm in the headquarters' employment area expressed as a percentage of total employment in the area. High visibility is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm's share of local employment belongs to the upper 25% of the visibility distribution and 0 otherwise. Low visibility is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the lower 75% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. (4) Control variables include: industry, time, firm and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies; dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment, and taxable income per capita as of 2004. (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (6) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

## Appendix

### A1. Derivation of the impact of visibility on the effect of distance to headquarters on dismissals

The derivative of  $D_i^*$  with respect to  $\alpha$  can be obtained in the same way as equation (1.4), which yields:

$$\frac{\partial D_i^*}{\partial \alpha} = \left( \frac{\lambda_G}{f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_i^G)} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_i^B)} \right) \gamma_i \quad (\text{A1})$$

Hence, the effect of visibility on the relationship between distance and dismissals is given by the sign of the following expression:

$$\frac{\partial(D_2^* - D_1^*)}{\partial \alpha} = \left( \frac{\lambda_G}{f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)} \right) \gamma_2 - \left( \frac{\lambda_G}{f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_1^G)} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_1^B)} \right) \gamma_1 \quad (\text{A2})$$

Taking into account that  $f_{NN} < 0$ , the right-hand side of (A2) is positive, if and only if

$$\beta > \frac{\frac{\lambda_G}{|f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)|} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)|}}{\frac{\lambda_G}{|f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_1^G)|} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_1^B)|}} \quad (\text{A3})$$

where  $\beta = \gamma_1/\gamma_2$  is the degree of selfishness and  $|x|$  denotes the absolute value of  $x$ . Since  $N_2^B < N_1^B$  and  $f_{NNN} \geq 0$ ,  $|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)| \geq |f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_1^B)|$ , the above inequality holds if:

$$\beta > \frac{\frac{\lambda_G}{|f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)|} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)|}}{\frac{r+\lambda_B}{|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)|}} = 1 + \frac{\frac{\lambda_G}{|f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)|}}{\frac{r+\lambda_B}{|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)|}} \quad (\text{A4})$$

The fact that  $f_{NNN} \geq 0$  implies that  $|f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)| \leq |f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_0^B)|$ , where  $N_0^B$  is the value obtained by solving equation (1.3) for  $b_i = 0$ . Similarly,  $|f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)| \geq |f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_0^G)|$ , where  $N_0^G$  is the value obtained by solving equation (1.2) for  $b_i = 0$ . Therefore a sufficient condition for (A4) to hold is that:

$$\beta > 1 + \frac{\frac{\lambda_G}{f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_0^G)}}{\frac{r+\lambda_B}{f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_0^B)}} \quad (\text{A5})$$

This implies that a sufficient condition for (A2) to be positive is that the degree of selfishness  $\beta = \gamma_1/\gamma_2$  be large enough.

## A2. Derivation of the effect of selfishness on the impact of visibility on the distance-dismissal relationship

Since, conditional on  $\gamma_1$ ,  $\beta$  does not affect  $D_1^*$ , it is straightforward that:

$$\frac{\partial(D_2^* - D_1^*)}{\partial\beta} = \frac{\partial D_2^*}{\partial\beta}$$

This implies that  $\partial^2(D_2^* - D_1^*)/\partial\alpha\partial\beta = \partial^2 D_2^*/\partial\alpha\partial\beta$ . Taking the first derivative of the right-hand side of equation (A1) with respect to  $\beta$  for  $i = 2$  and taking into account that  $\gamma_2 = \gamma_1/\beta$  yields:

$$\frac{\partial^2 D_2^*}{\partial\beta\partial\alpha} = -\frac{\gamma_1}{\beta^2} \left( \frac{\lambda_G}{f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)} + \frac{r+\lambda_B}{f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)} \right) + \frac{\gamma_1}{\beta} \left( \frac{\lambda_G f_{NNN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)}{[f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)]^2} \frac{\partial N_2^G}{\partial\beta} + \frac{(r+\lambda_B) f_{NNN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)}{[f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)]^2} \frac{\partial N_2^B}{\partial\beta} \right)$$

Taking into account that  $\frac{\partial N_2^G}{\partial\beta} = -\frac{\lambda_G \alpha \gamma_1}{\beta^2}$  and  $\frac{\partial N_2^B}{\partial\beta} = \frac{(r+\lambda_B) \alpha \gamma_1}{\beta^2}$  we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 D_2^*}{\partial\beta\partial\alpha} = -\frac{\gamma_1 \lambda_G}{\beta^2 f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)} \left( 1 - \frac{\lambda_G \alpha \gamma_1 f_{NNN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)}{\beta [f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)]^2} \right) - \frac{\gamma_1 (r+\lambda_B)}{\beta^2 f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)} \left( 1 + \frac{(r+\lambda_B) \alpha \gamma_1 f_{NNN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)}{\beta [f_{NN}(\theta_B, N_2^B)]^2} \right)$$

Given that  $f_{NN} < 0$ ,  $f_{NNN} \geq 0$ , and the last term in parentheses is positive, this expression is positive if  $\beta$  is sufficiently large so that  $\lambda_G \alpha \gamma_1 f_{NNN}(\theta_G, N_2^G) / \beta [f_{NN}(\theta_G, N_2^G)]^2 \leq 1$ . Obviously, this represents only a sufficient condition.

### A3. Appendix Tables

**Table A1 Descriptive statistics (main sample)**

<i>Variables</i>	Mean	S.D.	<i>Variables</i>	Mean	S.D.
Quarterly dismissal rate (%)	.97	4.59	Establishment size	136.43	299.13
Distance to HQ (km)	247.98	216.31	Establishment age (by class)		
Local unemployment rate (%)	8.41	1.96	2 years	.10	.30
Manager (%)	14.78	20.27	3 years	.10	.30
Technicians and supervisors (%)	24.81	21.41	4 years	.10	.30
Clerks (%)	27.09	31.15	5 years or more	.63	.48
Blue collars (%)	33.16	32.72			
Board members (%)	0.15	1.14	Firm size	906.8	4288.12
Women (%)	37.48	25.73	Firm age (years)	28.87	24.74
Manufacturing	.21	.41			
Services	.67	.47			

**Table A2 Visibility and Generosity at headquarters**

<i>Variables</i>	
Firm share of total employment in HQ's employment area (%)	
1 <sup>st</sup> quartile	0.026
2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile	0.090
3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile	0.299
Maximum	3.199
Ratio of total charity donations to GDP (%) in HQ's <i>département</i>	
Minimum	0.012
1 <sup>st</sup> quartile	0.092
2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile	0.128
3 <sup>rd</sup> quartile	0.181
Maximum	0.658

**Table A3 Separations (except dismissals)**  
(% of employment)

<i>Variables</i>	Mean	S.D.
Total separations	11.51	64.67
End of fixed-term contract	5.73	52.55
End-of-trial period	.55	2.55
Retirement	.33	2.41
Quits	1.78	4.19

**Table A4: Distance to headquarters (HQ) and dismissals 2003-2007: robustness checks**

Method	(1) OLS	(2) Tobit	(3) OLS
Sample	Full sample	Full sample	Removing Ile-de-France
Measure of distance	Log distance	Linear Distance	Linear Distance
Distance to HQ		0.0796*** (0.0194)	0.0303** (0.0139)
Log(distance to HQ)	3.980*** (1.120)		
Observations	257,747	272,021	120,205
R-squared	0.119	0.020	0.123
Control variables	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the quarterly dismissal rate in percentage multiplied by 100. (2) Control variables include: industry, time and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. Firm dummies are included everywhere except in column (2) where they are replaced by firm averages of all covariates (3) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (4) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A5: Distance to headquarters (HQ) and other types of worker separations 2003-2007**

Dependent variable	(1) Quits	(2) End of trial period	(3) Retirement	(4) End of fixed- term contracts
Distance to HQ	0.0137* (0.00798)	0.0103 (0.00801)	0.00194 (0.00438)	-0.0472 (0.0372)
Observations	272,020	272,024	272,024	271,802
R-squared	0.308	0.341	0.076	0.467
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) Rates are expressed in percentage multiplied by 100. (2) Control variables include: industry, time, firm and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. (3) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (4) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A6: Placebo tests - Visibility**

Dependent variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate
Distance to headquarters	0.009 (0.008)		-0.002 (0.007)	
Distance*Low visibility		0.004 (0.012)		-0.005 (0.008)
Distance*High visibility		0.013 (0.009)		0.011 (0.014)
Observations	228,405	228,405	228,405	228,405
R-squared	0.106	0.106	0.106	0.106
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) Plants in the same employment area of the HQ are excluded from the set where placebo HQ is drawn from. (2) Dismissal rates are expressed in percentage multiplied by 100. (3) Visibility is measured as the share of the firm in the headquarters' employment area expressed as a percentage of total employment in the area. High visibility is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm's share of local employment belongs to the upper 25% of the visibility distribution and 0 otherwise. Low visibility is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the lower 75% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. (4) Control variables include: industry, time, firm and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (6) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A7: Placebo tests - Generosity**

	(1) Placebo HQ = Largest plant in the area where the firm is most visible	(2) Placebo HQ = randomly drawn	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate
Distance to headquarters	0.012 (0.012)		0.009 (0.006)	
Distance*Low generosity		0.014 (0.013)		0.014 (0.011)
Distance*High generosity		-0.0012 (0.020)		0.006 (0.007)
Observations	201,004	201,004	223,960	223,960
R-squared	0.101	0.101	0.098	0.098
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) Plants in the same employment area of the HQ are excluded from the set where placebo HQ is drawn from. (2) Dismissal rates are expressed in percentage multiplied by 100. (3) Generosity is proxied by the ratio of total charity donations in 1887 to *département*-level GDP. In our regressions, high-generosity is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the *département* of the headquarters belongs to the upper 25% of the charity distribution and 0 otherwise. Symmetrically, headquarters are considered to be located in low-generosity *départements* if the latter belong to the bottom 75% of the distribution. (4) Control variables include: industry, time, firm and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (6) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

**Table A8: Excluding establishments in the same region as headquarters**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Visibility	Generosity	Generosity & Visibility
Dependent variable	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate	Dismissal rate
Dist.*Low (visibility or generosity)	0.023 (0.018)	0.098** (0.042)	
Dist*High (visibility or generosity)	0.065*** (0.019)	0.029* (0.015)	
Dist.*Low generosity*Low visibility			0.027 (0.050)
Dist*Low generosity*High visibility			0.209*** (0.074)
Dist.*High generosity*Low visibility			0.022 (0.017)
Dist*High generosity*High visibility			0.041** (0.017)
Observations	158,600	154,054	154,054
R-squared	0.129	0.129	0.129
Control variables	yes	yes	yes

Notes: (1) Dismissal rates are expressed in percentage multiplied by 100. (2) Generosity is proxied by the ratio of total charity donations in 1887 to *département*-level GDP. In our regressions, high-generosity is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the *département* of the headquarters belongs to the upper 25% of the charity distribution and 0 otherwise. Symmetrically, headquarters are considered to be located in low-generosity *départements* if the latter belong to the bottom 75% of the distribution (3) Visibility is measured as the share of the firm in the headquarters' employment area expressed as a percentage of total employment in the area. High visibility is captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm's share of local employment belongs to the upper 25% of the visibility distribution and 0 otherwise. Low visibility is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the lower 75% of the distribution and 0 otherwise. (4) Control variables include: industry, time, firm and employment-area dummies; the unemployment rate in the employment area of the establishment; the occupational and gender structure of the workforce; establishment age and size dummies; and dummies for firm size in the employment area of the establishment. (5) Robust standard errors clustered at the establishment level in parentheses. (6) \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.